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ACCESS TO PROTECTION FOR 
‘OFFSHORE ENTRY PERSONS’ 
aka asylum seekers 
ANGUS FRANCIS and SONIA CATON 
n the first months of 2011, over 12 000 refugees streamed into Italy from Libya (by boat) and 800 000 into other neighbouring 
countries; 41 000 Ivorians fled into Liberia; and Kenya received over 40 000 refugees from Somalia. Conditions for refugees in 
the host countries are harsh, but indefinite detention of each and every asylum seeker is not practised. Back in the antipodes, a 
comparatively modest 10 000 asylum seekers arrived by boat over a two year period, mostly from Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran. In 
response, Australian politicians are resorting to ever-more legally questionable responses as solutions to the politically dreaded 
‘irregular maritime arrivals,’ accompanied by language of ‘threat’. So relentless has this rhetoric been that a survey conducted in 
July 2010 found that 38 per cent of the Australian population believed that irregular maritime arrivals amounted to a tenth of the 
annual immigration intake, and 10 per cent of people thought it was at least half. The correct figure was 2.9 per cent of the 
permanent migration and humanitarian programs for 2009–10.1 
In February 2008, the Rudd Labor government brought the last refugees detained at the Nauru detention centre to Australia, 
effectively marking the disbandment of the so-called ‘Pacific solution’ — the Howard government’s policy of transferring onshore 
asylum seekers to third countries for detention and processing.2 Announcing its demise, the then Minister for Immigration and 
Citizenship, Senator Chris Evans, stated ‘the Pacific solution was a cynical, costly and ultimately unsuccessful exercise introduced 
on the eve of a Federal election by the Howard government.’3 However, the Rudd Labor government had no intention of repealing 
the Howard government’s 2001 amendments to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’) that purportedly provided the basis for the 
Pacific solution. 
Rather than repeal the 2001 amendments, successive Labor governments have sought to make full use of them. First, at the 
same time as the Rudd government disbanded offshore processing in third countries it embraced a policy of non-statutory 
processing of offshore entry persons in Australia. This process was referred to as the Refugee Status Assessment (‘RSA’) 
process between 2008 and 28 February 2011 and the Protection Obligations Determination (‘POD’) process from 1 March 2011 
(rebadged after the High Court cases of M61 and M69).  The result is a discriminatory and bifurcated system for processing 
claims for refugee status (and Protection Visas) determined solely by the mode and point of arrival of an asylum seeker in 
Australia. 
Second, the Gillard government sought to rely upon the 2001 amendments to re-enliven offshore processing in third countries, 
issuing a Ministerial declaration on 25 July 2011 that effectively stated that Malaysia was an appropriate country to transfer asylum 
seekers.  The declaration was based principally on a transfer and processing agreement signed with Malaysia on the same day.4 
On 31 August 2011, in Plaintiff M70/2011 a 6 to 1 majority of the High Court ruled that the Minister’s declaration was invalid.5  The 
decision put a (at least temporary) halt to the transfer of asylum seekers to Malaysia and raised serious questions concerning the 
lawfulness of processing on Nauru and Manus Island, PNG.  This article considers these developments in light of Australia’s 
obligations under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (‘the Convention’)6 and cognate rights instruments.  
The legislative scheme 
Following the 2001 amendments, an unlawful non-citizen (a non-citizen without a valid visa) who arrived at an ‘excised offshore 
place’7 became an ‘offshore entry person’ (‘OEP’).8 An OEP is prohibited from making a valid application for a visa to enter 
Australia.9 As a visa is the mechanism for lawful entry into Australia,10 this prohibition prima facie excludes all OEPs from the 
country. However, an OEP may be permitted to apply for a visa if the Minister for Immigration exercises his personal, 
non-compellable, non-reviewable power to lift the legislative bar that prohibits OEPs from applying for a visa.11 In practice, if the 
Minister chooses to ‘lift the bar’, a protection visa may be issued under a further non-compellable, non-reviewable discretionary 
provision that allows the Minister to issue a visa to a person held in detention.12  
The application of this scheme to OEPs has raised a number of issues with respect to Australia’s compliance with its international 
obligations. First, the Commonwealth argued before the High Court in the cases of M61 and M69 that the intent of the Act is to 
prevent OEPs from having a right under Australian law to make claims under the Convention.13 In its submissions it referred to the 
Second Reading Speech for the Bill, in which the Minister maintained that Australia can honour its obligations under the 
Convention ‘without those obligations being enforceable as a matter of domestic law [emphasis added]’.14 It is a truism that 
international rights are illusory unless enforceable domestically. The Australian government’s minimalist attitude undermines its 
obligation to interpret and apply the Convention in good faith.15  
Second, the government obviously considers that the broad powers of the Minister under the Act authorise the suspension of 
processing of OEPs, as occurred with Sri Lankan and Afghan nationals in 2010.16 Arguably, this amounts to a breach of the 
non-discrimination principle found in the Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.17 Third, OEPs 
have been refused permission to apply for a visa in Australia and instead taken to a ‘declared country’ (as happened with the 
majority of asylum seekers taken to Nauru and PNG).18 Removal to a third country was back on the table following an agreement 
between Australia and Malaysia on a ‘swap’ of refugees.19  
As the refugees have come under its jurisdiction, Australia is obligated under international law to assess on a case-by-case basis 
whether transfer to Malaysia or some other third country deprives a refugee of the rights acquired by the transferee under the 
Convention and cognate rights instruments (including the right to access the courts to remedy a denial of a right).20 The extent of 
the government’s satisfaction of this requirement in relation to asylum seekers to be transferred to Malaysia was the Ministerial 
I
declaration of 25 July 2011 and a pre-removal assessment.   
The High Court in Plaintiff M70/2011 held that the Minister’s declaration was invalid on the basis that Malaysia is not a party to the 
Convention or its Protocol, does not recognise the status of refugees in domestic law and does not undertake activities related to 
the reception, registration, documentation and status determination of asylum seekers and refugees, and has made no legally 
binding arrangement with Australia obliging it to accord the protections under the Convention and its Protocol.21  The High Court’s 
decision also highlighted that the pre-removal assessment, which should have included a case by case assessment of the risks 
faced by removal of asylum seekers to Malaysia, as well as a consideration of the best interests of the child, was a truncated and, 
in the case of children, unlawful process.   
At the time of writing, the government is considering legal advice to the effect that Plaintiff M70/2011 precludes it from reintroducing 
processing on Nauru or PNG (as the legislation now stands).  While the joint judgment did allude to the fact that processing on 
Nauru was undertaken by Australian officials (as was the case with PNG), it is far from certain whether that processing itself 
satisfied Australia’s obligations under the Convention.22   
The successful challenge in the High Court also illustrates the importance of OEPs having access to independent legal advice.  Of 
concern, OEPs who arrived following the Joint Statement of the Australian and Malaysian Prime Ministers on 7 May 2011 were not 
given access to independent legal advice for the purpose of lodging protection claims or to contest their proposed removal to 
Malaysia or some other third country, arguably in contravention of the Convention.23 Strictly speaking, the Act requires detainees to 
be provided with access to legal advice only upon the request of the detainee.24  But this raises obvious problems for detainees 
who are unlikely to know they have this right under the Act,25 or where, despite the making of such requests, detainees are advised 
they are being held solely for the administrative purpose of removal and no claims will be accepted.  The policy led to the indefinite 
detention of OEPs without any guarantee of removal to a third country or of processing in Australia — a matter that was the subject 
of proceedings in the High Court.26 After the signing of the transfer agreement with Malaysia on 25 July 2011 an announcement 
was made that this cohort would be processed in Australia.27 However, recent arrivals faced a similar situation of detention pending 
removal on a date unknown,28 until a chance referral to legal representation. 
A further issue that the High Court did not address was the standard of processing by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (‘UNHCR’) in Malaysia.  UNHCR processing was a key plank of the arrangements between Australia and 
Malaysia.29  Yet, the UNHCR determination procedures in Malaysia do not adequately allow for legal representation, do not require 
written reasons for decisions, and do not provide for independent merits or judicial review.30 These factors increase the risk of 
refoulement of refugees from Malaysia, exposing Australia to charges of engaging in the indirect or chain refoulement of refugees 
by sending them to an unsafe third country.31 
RSA and POD processes 
Alternatively, the Act allows for OEPs to be held in detention in Australia and assessed for refugee status under a non-statutory 
procedure (the RSA, rebadged the POD process after M61 and M69), with recommendations then made to the Minister as to 
whether it is in the public interest for him to lift the legislative bar and allow them to apply for protection — at which point he 
exercises his discretion to grant a visa to a person in immigration detention.32  These non-statutory processes have been applied 
irrespective of whether an OEP is brought to the mainland, as the government considers that OEPs do not lose their status as a 
result of transfer to mainland detention facilities.33 
The RSA process was set out in policy guidelines issued by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (‘DIAC’) called the 
Refugee Status Assessment Procedures Manual. The Manual was based on a similar non-statutory process that was applied to the 
determination of refugee claims on Nauru and Manus Island, PNG. The RSA process included an initial determination of refugee 
status by an officer of DIAC followed by an independent review by an employee of a government contractor (Wizard Pty Ltd). If 
successful, a submission was made to the Minister that the Minister ‘lift the bar’ under the Act. The Minister then had the 
non-compellable and non-reviewable power to decide whether to permit the person to apply for a protection visa.34 
The RSA process sought to substitute a clear legislative basis and criteria for the grant of a protection visa, interpreted by a wealth of 
authoritative case law, with administrative guidelines. Ironically, in 2006 the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee 
rejected the Howard government’s attempts to extend the Pacific Solution to unlawful arrivals on the Australian mainland, for the very 
reason that the non-statutory processing regime on Nauru, undertaken by Australian officials, effectively excluded refugees from 
statutory protections, tribunals and the courts in Australia.35  
While states parties to the Convention have the discretion to determine what procedures apply,36 they are required to adopt a fair 
and effective status determination process in order to properly identify those needing protection.37 The UNHCR has raised 
concerns with the RSA process on the basis that there should be ‘a legislative basis for decisions, to ensure clarity and to ground 
the decisions, to the extent possible, in Australian law in a non-discriminatory manner.’38 UNHCR also takes the view that 
Australia’s non-statutory scheme, whether applied onshore or offshore, risks breaching the Convention obligation not to penalize 
refugees based on the mode of their arrival because of the lower standards of processing applied to OEPs (who arrive by boat 
without a valid visa).39  
The RSA process was intended to operate independently of judicial review of any determination, or non-determination, by the 
Minister. According to the government, because the Minister was under no duty to consider whether to exercise their discretion to 
‘lift the bar’ it followed that there could also be no judicial review of the non-statutory procedures up to that point. If successfully 
maintained as a matter of domestic law, this position would amount to a clear denial of the right of refugees under international law 
to seek judicial review of an adverse refugee status determination.40 It would also lead to an increased risk of refoulement — the 
return of a person to the frontiers of territories where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or her race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion41 — by denying access to the courts that scrutinize 
asylum decision-making.42 
M61 and M69 of 2010 
The RSA process eventually went to the High Court of Australia in the cases M61 and M69.43 The Plaintiff in each proceeding was 
an OEP who, having made an RSA application, was assessed by an officer of DIAC and an independent reviewer to be a person to 
whom Australia did not have protection obligations under the Convention. The result was that DIAC did not make a submission to 
the Minister as to whether or not the Minister should consider ‘lifting the bar’ under the Act. Judicial review was sought in the High 
Court’s original jurisdiction under s 75 of the Australian Constitution. Both applicants alleged they had been denied natural justice at 
the primary and review stages, and both argued that the departmental delegates and reviewers had committed errors of law by 
failing to consider themselves bound by the provisions of the Act or by domestic case law in arriving at their recommendations to 
the Minister.  
The Court found in M61/M69 that the non-statutory decision-making process was in fact statutory and as such, the common law 
rules of procedural fairness applied, as did the Act and domestic case law. The Court was satisfied that: (1) as there were no words 
expressly excluding the requirement for procedural fairness; and (2) that an exercise of the discretions to ‘lift the bar’ and to grant a 
visa to a detainee directly affected rights and interests of the Plaintiffs, and (3) given the refugee status determination scheme 
being applied to OEP’s was implicitly tied to the operation of sections of the Act — the process must be procedurally fair. The Court 
then upheld the argument that the substance of adverse country information had not been put to the Plaintiffs for response. Further, 
the Court found that the departmental delegates and reviewers erred in law by regarding provisions of the Act and domestic case 
law as merely providing ‘guidance’, rather than being legally binding.  
Following the High Court’s decision in M61/M69, DIAC revised the RSA process and rebadged it the ‘POD process’, which 
recognises the jurisdiction of the courts to review OEP refugee status determinations.44 However, the government retained the 
essential features of the RSA process: the use of administrative procedural guidelines to direct decision-makers and the 
outsourcing of the merits review function to employees of a private company.   
Darabi v Minister for Immigration & Anor is one of the first cases to have been determined by the Federal Magistrates Court post 
M61/69.45 Federal Magistrate Nicholls ultimately found against the contention that the decision-making process had not been 
procedurally fair in that instance. Natural justice obligations were satisfied in that case without the necessity for the source of text 
and text itself (often vital country information that may be selectively quoted from or be from non-credible sources) to be put to the 
claimant where the ‘substance of the issues and the substance of the subject country information was put to the claimant’ at the 
review interview.46 But depending on the circumstances of a case, Nicholls FM entertained the possibility that the claimant may 
‘only have the opportunity to meaningfully respond when he has been given the actual text.’47 He noted an opportunity for 
post-hearing submissions was not taken advantage of and dismissed the application. In contrast, Raphael FM in SZPAC v Minister 
for Immigration found that the independent merits reviewer erroneously believed that he was under no obligation to provide the 
applicant with details of the adverse country information which he intended to use against the applicant’s claim.48 
Practical barriers facing OEPs 
The cases of Darabi and SZPAC provide a useful counterpoint for a discussion around practical obstacles presently facing OEPs 
seeking to exercise their rights. A fair and effective status determination process requires, among other things, a right to legal 
assistance and representation.49 The government seeks to meet this obligation with respect to OEPs through the Immigration 
Advice And Assistance Scheme (‘IAAAS’), which pays several contracted migration firms and two community legal centres on a 
case-by-case basis, to assist OEPs prepare their claims for protection, and if unsuccessful, represent them upon review.  
At the primary level, contract conditions do not limit IAAAS providers in how many applications they prepare in a day, or stipulate 
baseline services, such as whether clients should be interviewed prior to the lodgment of review submissions. The only guides lie in 
professional duties as a Solicitor (for those migration agents who are also solicitors) and the Code of Conduct within the Act 
applying to Migration Agents. This means in practice that most providers supply ‘task forces’ in which each migration agent 
prepares three OEP applications for protection in one day in detention centres. Given the trying circumstances in which such 
applications are prepared, it is arguable that in doing so, at least some migration agents are breaching the Code of Conduct which 
requires them to act in the best interests of their clients.  
In particular, many people are deeply traumatised and do not fully state their claims easily. Time is required to build a modicum of 
trust and explain why it is that they must carefully recount painful events; to examine transcripts of prior interviews conducted by 
departmental officers (known as entry interviews) addressing any inconsistencies that may have arisen; and to gain access to the 
internet to check country information. Almost without exception, there is no internet access for migration agents in detention centres 
and so must be done out of hours elsewhere. Country information can make all the difference to the depth, and thus 
persuasiveness, of a statement of claims. And finally, time is required to ensure that translation is as accurate as possible as many 
of the interpreters have little training and are not accredited.  
Rushing an application can lead to misunderstandings that can badly damage the credibility of applicants and lead to rejections of 
applications. The critical importance of contact with a representative at the primary level is amplified by the fact that it is rare for an 
agent to return to a remote detention centre after an unsuccessful finding by a departmental delegate to conduct another face to 
face interview. Access by telephone to detention centres is in practice also extremely difficult since personal mobile phones were 
banned. As a result, it is commonplace for most agents to have minimal contact with asylum seeker clients after a departmental 
interview until an hour before an independent review hearing. Further, the challenging logistics of running merit review hearings 
across the country in many remote locations means that it is unusual for an applicant to have the same agent at a review hearing. 
The case of SZPAC illustrates the importance of ensuring that OEPs have access to the courts to challenge the decisions of 
independent merits reviewers.50 The risk of refouling people in breach of Article 33 of the Convention is very real when returns are 
based on possibly unlawful merit review decisions and access to justice is ad hoc.51 Ensuring access to the courts requires 
measures to make this right a reality, eg providing legal representation, adequate translation facilities.52 Strict time limits and lack of 
access to legal representation are undermining access to the courts for OEPs who have had an unsuccessful merits review. An 
extension of time was granted in the case of Darabi partly because it was recognised by the Court that not speaking English, dealing 
with complex legal issues, and being held in a remote detention centre will make it much harder for an applicant to file within time. 
The finding however can only have been aided by the Minister’s consent for the additional required remedy (injunction) to be added 
to the pleadings late in the piece.  
A fundamental and additional reason why many pleadings are currently being filed out of time is the lack of dedicated funding for 
judicial review cases of this nature. Anecdotal evidence of the variation in the quality of IAAAS service delivered, dependent upon 
which service provider is allocated is sobering, and access to judicial review would seem to be all the more important. The variation 
between IAAAS service providers also has a direct bearing on whether an asylum seeker will take advantage of the legal right to 
judicial review, despite the many barriers. Further, some service providers facilitate a referral of a matter to a state public interest 
law clearing house (‘PILCH’) and/or Legal Aid Commission (‘LAC’), while others provide no assistance.  
There is now a growing movement of community advocates organising in tandem with pro bono lawyers to gain access to remote 
detention centres, to obtain the paperwork and authorisations necessary to pursue cases for judicial review. Time limits tick by 
inexorably, and increasingly community advocates are filing applications based on pro forma pleadings in the Federal Magistrates 
Court to ‘stop the clock’, before they then resume the search for pro bono lawyers who have the necessary expertise to assess 
cases for merits and represent in the FMC.53 LACs in Victoria and NSW in particular are doing their best to fund cases that meet 
the public interest and merit tests within their own tight budgets. Yet despite this frantic activity, there are arguably over 1000 
people in detention who are not going to have their cases considered for judicial review. In short, the practical reach of M61/69 is 
being undermined by the lack of funding and the sheer remoteness and inaccessibility by phone or otherwise of potential 
applicants. 
Conclusion 
Irregular people movement, which applies to most seeking protection, is here to stay. Australia has a tradition of strong 
governance, functioning non-corrupt legal institutions and extensive civil society involvement in refugee status determination and 
support. It should be engaging in a far more systematic and positive way to achieve lawful, long term, durable and safe regional 
solutions for asylum seekers. Legislation and short term policy responses driven by immediate political imperatives have not solved 
‘the boat’ issue. Only about 1500 people were ever held on Nauru and Manus Island, and reduced boat arrivals at that time 
coincided with a lull in the strength of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and a decline in atrocities in Iraq. Both situations have 
re-intensified, with the addition of the brutal oppression of dissent in Iran. These country-of-origin conditions have prompted new 
outflows of asylum seekers who know they may encounter appalling reception conditions, but staying where they are is not an 
option. Regional bilateral agreements negotiated in a hurried and covert fashion do not do justice to a country that speaks the 
language of human rights internationally, and that has the resources and human capital to advocate for and help build truly path 
breaking and enduring solutions that safeguard the legal and psycho-social well being of asylum seekers. In the interim, all asylum 
seekers arriving in Australia, irrespective of their place or mode of arrival should have their claims assessed equally under domestic 
law and in accordance with our international obligations.  
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